The flyover frenzy
20-October-2011
It is not only that the urban population of Pakistan is on a sharp increase. Every year, 134,000 cars and 835,000 motorcycles are being added to Pakistan’s increasingly congested roads, not to mention the numberless rickshaws, to enable urban commuters to travel to workplaces and homes. The main response of the government, whether in Islamabad or provincial capitals like Lahore or Karachi, is to build flyovers and widen roads, even if this involves cutting old roadside trees. The provincial governments think this “progress” is going to get them votes while it incidentally eases traffic: the resulting relief in traffic is merely temporary and the impact on their vote banks at best remains doubtful and to be proven in the future.
Like the population increase, the maddening traffic is growing exponentially in our cities, becoming such a scourge that it makes one wish one were living in a village.
Countless billions of rupees are spent on flyover-building and road-widening projects, even though they only benefit the owners of cars, not the less fortunate Pakistanis who have few other means of viable transport in the absence of functioning public transport, like buses. The motorbikes and rickshaws used by those who can afford them in the latter group only serve to clutter the roads still further.
All over the world, governments spend far more money on betterment of public transport, rather than on flyovers and wider roads. London, whose public transport we admire so much, is a fine example of this. London was spending £4 billion in subsidy on public transport every year until two years back when I had the opportunity to interact with its top public transport body, Transport for London (TFL). In Delhi, the government spent $4 billion on making the subway, apart from putting 3,000 state-of-the-art buses on city roads.
Less than a decade ago, the city government in Karachi started 50 CNG buses with great fanfare, but because the model was unsustainable, they were discarded not too long after the launch. The government introduced a scheme of 8,000 CNG buses and even allocated money in the PSDP, but so far not a single bus has come onto the road.
Similar headlines have been made in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and the Islamabad administration has been making promises for the improvement of public transport in the country’s capital. But there are no additional vehicles on the roads there.
In Punjab the government introduced the concept of exclusivity of routes and franchising. That experiment is in tatters. This was partly because of a court order striking down exclusivity and partly because the government was incapable of managing and supervising such a fleet even if it were owned by private operators. So after six decades public transport in all cities consists of the crudest buses driven by untrained drivers.
In Faisalabad an experiment in organisation of public transport with the involvement of the community and owners of public service vehicle was started in 1993. A legal entity was created by the commissioner (your truly was the incumbent), which laid down the rules of plying PSV (public service vehicles) in the city. The FUTS (Faisalabad Urban Transport System) provided support to the owners of vehicles to make sure their investment gave them good returns.
It was a smashing success. But it was deliberately undone by the-then government in Lahore, which wanted to introduce the franchising system all over the province. Because the model of FUTS was sustainable and realistic, it still limps along in Faisalabad and provides the bulk of public transport, without government support.
In 2008, when the new government in Punjab came into power, a task force was set up to find a solution for public transport in the province. I was made chairman of that task force because of my Faisalabad experience. After due deliberations, it was decided to set up a company which would handle all matters pertaining to regulating and organising public transport in Lahore, while the ownership of vehicles would be private. The Lahore Transport Co (LTC) was the first organisation after the demise of the PRTC more than 20 year ago which provided the capacity to the government to run public transport.
In all the provinces, public transport is expected to be managed by the transport department, which is actually manned and trained to make policy rather than regulate and run buses. Unlike other countries we have no organisation with specialists like transport planners, fare specialists and public transport engineers. The LTC was the first in this respect.
The LTC started with great promise, by finding urban transport specialists (a rare commodity in Pakistan), making systems and setting up an electronic surveillance system to track and monitor buses. We offered an attractive subsidy package to investors to bring new buses and run them and the LTC was to regulate the investor’s buses, with the guarantee that he would make a 20 percent return on his investment.
Despite all kinds of allurements, the investor was reluctant to come forth because of apprehension on account of the government’s track record on paying subsidy in time. He needed assurance of at least five years for the recovery of the cost of his vehicle. Only one foreign investor, with a promise of 200 buses, showed interest and reportedly is now bringing 110 buses.
We pleaded with the government to place the budgeted money with the LTC, or in any arrangement where the investor would know that if the government changed his investment would be safe. But we were told that the government resources did not allow it to withdraw such a large amount in one go. However, a few weeks later the flyover of Kalma Chawk was launched, where about the same amount of money that the LTC required to bring buses on the roads was spent on brick, mortar and cement.
There is no hope for public transport in cities without the government paying out substantial subsidies. If subsidies are needed in any sector, it is in public transport; as evidenced by experience in the rest of the world. But in our country the politicians’ priority seems to be infrastructure expenditure like flyovers, underpasses, wider roads rather than subsidised public transport through a transparent and sustainable system which a special purpose company like the LTC is capable of providing.
It is time we stopped pampering and subsidising the motorist by building roads and flyovers and started channelling that money into public transport to enable affordable decent, comfortable transport to the public so that the mad rush to add more cars, motorcycles, and Quingqi would abate, and a modicum of order can return to our roads. The alternative is sick cities with clogged arteries in the next five years.
The Karachi imbroglio
14-September-2011
A lot of people say that the solution to the problems of Karachi is a political settlement. I think that is a lot of hogwash. We have been playing politics in Karachi for a number of years, with the last three years being the most critical phase, and look where we have taken Karachi.
There are now three major parties and a number of smaller ones which want a share of Karachi's cake. How will they come to a peaceful and amicable arrangement when there are irreconcilable conflicts of interest? The MQM has ruled the roost for many years and now the People's Party wants to claw back and reclaim the control if at least part of the city. Learning from the MQM, the Pakhtuns, who are a significant percentage of the population, have decided to physically wrest their share of the pie. The PPP has also learned from the MQM model and set up its muscle squads.
There are no rules to the game. The party which controls the government, earlier the MQM and now the PPP, wants everything its own way. The PPP's inspector general of the Sindh police says almost 40 percent of his force are political appointees. He actually means they are beholden to the MQM and thus not under his complete control.
The PPP-MQM coalition only lasts as long as the killings stay within a certain limit. When that threshold is crossed, the MQM goes out of the government but then quietly returns with a bit of rest and acceptance of some more terms from the PPP. The PPP offers concessions with no intention of sticking to them, so while all this buys time for the government to stay a little longer in power, the actual development of criminals and gangs is gaining strength through unchecked criminality at the street level. The various political and religious groups in Karachi continue sheltering their hoodlums. It is a win-win situation for goons, as no one gets arrested. Even if some really incorrigible ones with the blood of scores on their hands get caught by the police, they get out promptly on bail because of poor paperwork by the prosecution and the implicit threat to the judges.
The result of this politics of "mufahimat" (conciliation), more of which is in store, is nothing. After President Asif Ali Zardari meets Altaf Hussain in London or telephones him, the MQM will be back in government, until the inevitable tension develops again, in less than three months. All this while complaints and counter-complaints and killings will continue, while the two leaders will maintain a measured silence.
This strategy is fine for the government to survive its five-year term. But is anyone thinking of what happens during these five years, with governance, especially law and order, deteriorating? To ask for the army to take over Karachi is like going for steroids because antibiotics have become ineffective. The army will at best provide temporary relief. As for the Rangers, the current director general of the Rangers pointed out that the killers who have gone into hiding will reappear when his force is pulled back.
What will special operations do if the police is either incompetent or politically constrained? The investigation is without resources, the prosecution is scared of reprisal, and the judges will either use lack of evidence or poor prosecution as an excuse. Unless these matters are tackled, how can any government control a city as large and important as Karachi?
More politics, which is all this reconciliation is about, will therefore not achieve anything. What is required is an independent non-political laws-enforcement mechanism under a civilian setup. People and economic development requires peace and law and order. The elected representatives can manage the local bodies, concentrate on infrastructure, improve traffic and clean up the environment.
However, we will have to find a way to take away the law- enforcement setup from the politicians. The MQM has controlled the police for a long time and used the opportunity to avenge the "invasion" of the party's turf in the 1990s. Now that the PPP controls the police and the MQM is crying foul, while the ANP and Pakhtuns have their own agendas. We can't have sustainable peace unless we find a solution or develop an impartial law-enforcement system.
The main players in the game, including the army and the judiciary, need to sit down and find a solution. The process to elect the most suitable counsellors and MPAs begins with a fair electoral role and rational boundaries of constituencies. The Election Commission needs to complete that work quickly, so that election results are not rejected by the losers in the form of more violence. Similarly, crime control has to be an element on which there should be increased emphasis.
Is it possible to have a police force and a prosecution agency which is independent of the political rulers of the time? In the present circumstances the answer would be no. But we have to turn this no into a yes to save the future of our children. Perhaps the judiciary and the army can be given the task of controlling the law-enforcement agencies of Karachi, while the politicians can handle development and social-welfare issues. We will have to think out of the box and find a model which is sustainable, because Karachi has no future unless there is zero tolerance for crime and the prosecution secures convictions.
Unless the killings stop
26-August-2011
Our threshold of tolerance is currently around twenty killed a day in Karachi. Below that, no one moves or cares. Even the public goes to the next headline in the newspaper and flicks to the next channel.
Above that figure, the government "moves" and "decisively" dispatches Rehman Malik to Karachi. Now that "effective step" has been replaced by the president himself calling a meeting of all concerned. Meetings result in statements of the interior minister, like "keeping a watch on Karachi through aerial surveillance", as if the interior ministry does now believe the press report. If the pressure mounts further, the interior minister, based on his superior intelligence sources, finds evil in the eyes of the women of Karachi, who are getting their errant husbands or boyfriends killed by hired assassins.
The public is distracted for a few days by the "effective" actions of the government. In the meantime, the killings go down to five or six a day on their own and the public attention moves to the next problem, most likely the frequent power outages, until the next time the death toll exceeds 20.
There is seldom any pressure on the police IG or the chief minister because everyone has already given up on the police and the provincial government. So we have now a situation where, on an average, a dozen or so people are killed daily, not just shot but brutally mutilated, in the commercial capital of the country, and we concede the police is helpless, the Rangers have no training and it is futile to call the army in without the cause of the strife being addressed. Because people dying are not part of the ruling elite, there is no urgency in finding a solution, as long as the government gets a few more months.
How long can this continue? It is not just people being killed but, since Karachi is the commercial hub of the country, the unrest is affecting the livelihoods of millions of people in the city and in the rest of Pakistan. While our problems in the northwest of the country have been brought about by the wild, Islamic extremists, exasperated by developments beyond our control, like getting the US to leave Afghanistan, the killings in Karachi are the result of a squabble for political and economic hegemony, between the three ethnic groups controlled by an avowedly educated class, which had lived together peacefully for the first four decades of Pakistan.
The MQM gained control of Karachi through its superior internal organisation, effectively aided by a dreaded militant wing, both for keeping its own members in line and for taking on opponents. The ANP, learning from the MQM model, responded by organising itself along similar lines. The PPP, in an effort not to become totally irrelevant in Karachi, has devised the Lyari Gangs/Peace Committee strategy. The result: a three-way uncontrolled gang war motivated by political gains and money. The police, which in all civilised countries is the only force to control a metropolis, however large, has been rendered ineffective, because the staff owe their recruitment to one party or the other, even the senior officers.
The divided loyalty of the police in its rank and file and the way some of them were physically eliminated in the past, is the perfect recipe for disaster that we are seeing.
The Rangers have stayed on permanently, costing the provincial government more than its own paramilitary squad would, because the Ranger provide a false sense of security. The police do not oppose their deployment because the Rangers' presence gives it someone to share the blame with for the crisis in Karachi.
The very fact of the Rangers' permanent deployment in Karachi has rendered their presence ineffectual. Besides, they are not trained for policing, crime investigation or follow up. They can only kill, like a squad killed Sarfraz Shah recently. You can't blame them because that is what they are trained to do.
We can let the present dispensation continue. The ruling elite and the business class will not know where to run once the gang war spreads to their areas, which are relatively insulated so far. Before that happens, it is in the interest of everyone, including the MQM, to do something. The recent reversion to the pre-Musharraf system was a brief ray of hope, because in that system you could have a neutral law-and-order machinery and a criminal justice system, away from the command of the politicians. But that was not to be. The MQM actually got more than they asked for. They would be quite happy to have their nazims in Karachi and Hyderabad, but now it seems the whole of Sindh will follow a system very few like.
But what they must realise that, with both the ANP and the PPP having armed themselves, its hegemony in this business has weakened. An MQM nazim with the police under him will be a party to the fight, which in itself will make the police ineffective. It is in its own long-term interest to have a system where the law-and-order machinery is independent and neutral. Such an arrangement is not in conflict with a strong local government system, which can continue on almost the same lines and be as autonomous as in the Musharraf era.
Without an effective and confident civil administration and police, which is neutral and has the moral and physical power to arrest and prosecute anyone or raid any compound, peace can never return to Karachi. Unless confidence, effectiveness and the powers of the chief secretary and the IG is restored, there can be no peace in Karachi. Without peace, the future of political parties, including the MQM, is in doubt, because a stage will come when the dons with their hired assassins will grab the power for themselves, rather than do the bidding of their political masters.
Restore executive magistracy
27-July-2011
If there is something the present government has done right, it is to restore the commissionerate system, the pre-Musharaf administrative set-up in Sindh. But it seems to have done it for the wrong reason, to spite the MQM.
Soon after the takeover by the present government in early 2008, Dr Asim Hussain, who then headed the National Reconstruction Bureau, chaired a meeting in which the chief secretaries of the four provinces unanimously recommended the scrapping of Musharraf’s local government system and reversion to the old system. The chairman seemed inclined to accept the recommendations of the chief secretaries, but it was obvious that the government was reluctant, for fear of annoying the MQM.
It is a pity that a purely administrative decision has been politicised. One can understand that the MQM prefers the local government system because the party feels that it can control the administration of Karachi through its Nazims, especially the police. But as recent events have proved, the MQM’s hold in Karachi is going to face increasing challenges from other ethnic groups. In the present situation, the emerging discontent of the city’s other ethnic groups will never allow peace to return. That can happen only through a neutral and strong administration which was delivered by the old system, of which neutrality was the hallmark.
The basic flaw in Musharraf’s local government system was that it combined the role of the state with that of local governments. Musharraf’s system looks good in a Power-Point presentation, but the common man could not understand it in 10 years since it was introduced. In the case of law and order, the system of Nazims was simply not cut out to enable the taking of the hard decisions required in maintenance of law and order.
In times of crisis, the Nazims left town or went underground, and the police bumbled through. The chain of command existing under a deputy commissioner no longer existed.
Musharraf’s local government experiment has destroyed the fabric of our administrative machinery. Switching back is not going to be easy. The restored old system will have to be nurtured back to effectiveness by the Sindh government. The mixing up of development work with the role of the state has corrupted our lower bureaucracy, including the younger officers.
As for the separation of the judiciary from the executive, a number of segments, but not the judiciary, have been vocal about it. As I understand, the separation was completed under the Legal Reforms Ordinance, 1996, which allowed the executive magistrates to function within certain parameters. They were functioning when Musharraf demolished the system. Reversion to it should not be an insurmountable problem, however, especially after the 18th and 19th Amendments.
The executive magistrate adjudicated criminal offences which involved sentences of a maximum of three years. More serious offences were tried by the judiciary. The concept of executive and area magistrates was to combine the role of judicial and executive powers at the delivery level, together with the supervision of police stations. The magistrate’s judicial role and performance was subject to control and review by the actual judiciary. His record was examined by the high court and the lower judiciary and he was judged by the quality of his work.
The advantage was that while a civil judge was not responsible for the impact of his work on society, the performance of executive or area magistrates was judged by the individual’s ability to maintain peace in his area and take pre-emptive action, where that was required.
We Pakistanis continue to try to reinvent the wheel. If Musharraf’s devolution was really such a good idea, why has India, which has a more educated and assertive public, not felt the need to implement it? Further, if the Indians had simply failed to realise its importance previously, they would have followed suit after Musharraf’s introduction of the system if they had found it better. Both India and Bangladesh continue to run better than Pakistan, through district administrations headed by deputy commissioners. Only in metropolitan cities is there a case to be made for a separate system there.
There is need for the restoration of the executive magistracy. If that is found necessary, its powers can be enhanced, to the extent where they were in the 1980 and 1990s. They would not in any way challenge the authority of the judiciary but still be able to re-establish the writ of the government. The government of Sindh needs to be for commended for taking the initiative for reversion to the old system.
One often hears criticism of what is called Pakistan’s return to the colonial Police Act of 1861. But the critics miss the point that the only institution in the country which still works, the army, operates under another act promulgated by the British in the 19th century, the Army Act. The concept of a unit under a lieutenant colonel is still the basic unit formation. Senior officers still gather in a ceremony to pin ranks on the shoulders of retired officers to make the recipient colonel of the battalion. All “colonial” traditions are therefore intact. But that has not wrecked that institution; rather, it has helped it retain its effectiveness.
One sees spite against the DMG cadre in some groups of the bureaucracy. DMG officers, like most government servants, mostly come from middle-class families, who enter the field through open competitive exams, without recommendations. Every young man dreams of joining the elite service. The concept of elite service groups is found in bureaucracies and in the corporate sectors of most countries. In our country, we appear to enjoy destroying anything that is working well. Let’s not oppose reversion to a system, which has stood the test of time and is being successfully followed by our neighbours, simply to spite a group of citizens of this country.
If we do, we will continue to dream of the writ of government that this country enjoyed not so long ago.
Why not a 20th amendment?
12-April-2011
The quest to find on alternative to this government continues. Even the president has admitted that there is talk of a takeover by “technocrats.” But is an extra-constitutional change the answer to our problems?
Constitutionally, the only method possible for a change is the courts passing an order making the president ineligible to hold office. But even then all that will change is that Bilawal House will become the seat of power. The style of governance is unlikely to change.
The major drawback of any extra-constitutional measure is that these three years we suffered in the name of democracy will have been wasted. We will be back to square one, making the change no different from the previous ones in the nineties, apart from giving the PPP a martyr status. If extra-constitutional measures are out, and the PML-N is comfortable with the status quo, as is obvious, then what is the way forward to put this uncertainty to rest? There is one solution which, in my view, takes care of most of the issues which are an impediment to a way forward.
The government’s tenure is five years in our Constitution, while no democratic government has ever completed a five-year term in our history. Even Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who ruled for five-and-a-half years, ruled as civilian prime minister for less than four, from 14 Aug, 1973, to July 5, 1977. In the fifties, before Ayub’s martial law, the average term of office of an elected government was around one year. In the nineties, when the PPP and the PML-N played a game of musical chairs, the average tenure of government was two years. In the next decade how can we expect a democratic government to last five years?
The logical evolution process would make a three-year term more compatible with our political development. We are still a politically immature and impatient lot and five-year term for a government is incompatible with our temperament. The US president has a four-year term.
If not three (the politician will hit the ceiling at this suggestion) our term of government should be four years. If we have 19 amendments to the Constitution, why can’t we have a 20th amendment? The advantages of a four-year term will be manifold. Firstly, the next elections will be due in eleven months, which will divert the attention of the political and other forces from finding ways to get rid of the present government to participation in the next elections. This would stabilise the current uncertain situation, where there is a new rumour every week about a likely new setup. Secondly, the need for looking for an extra-constitutional method or in-house change will be obviated. These four years spent in experimenting with democracy will be counted as time spent in the development of democracy in the country. Thirdly, it will take the pressure off the government which can happily concentrate on governance rather than looking over its shoulder all the time. Fourthly, and most important, it will make the term of government more realistic and reduce the chances of an extra-constitutional intervention in the future.
I have no doubt that such a proposal will be opposed by most politicians, because they will argue that elections have become very expensive and therefore elections should be held every five years rather than four. If the tenure of government is reduced, perhaps the political aspirants of the future will adjust their expenditures accordingly. Some people will say four years is not enough to execute the policies of a new government. One may ask which strategy, policy or project of the current government, in power for three years, is awaiting implementation and will be adversely affected by reduction in term? Four years is adequate, as seen in a number of democracies, to conceive, implement and consolidate most initiatives. If, however, we are going to link the tenure of government to the gestation period of building a dam, we’ll have to fix the tenure at ten years.
The response of the PPP is likely to be, why such a proposal in their term? Well, one can say that it offers the party a chance for a graceful exit or coming back again to power for another four years. It may even be an opportune to go back to the voter earlier, because one year later pubic may have become that much more disappointed with the government. In any case, a four-year term will reduce the chance of the government being thrown out. Unless the PPP wants that, because it can then claim that it was not able to deliver because its tenure was cut short.
The PML-N seems complicit with the PPP in letting things drift the way they are, because they are enjoying unbridled power in Punjab, their main, and perhaps only, base. With the indisposition of Mian Nawaz Sharif, the inclination for an early election for the PML-N may be even less welcome.
Despite the likely reluctance of the major political players in the field, the logical and the long-lasting solution is to have the constitutional tenure of the government more in line with the nation’s temperament and stage of political development. If we let things slide the way they are doing currently, we may have to restart the process of rebuilding Pakistan, from square one.
Need for coexistence
17-March-2011
The instinct to make comparisons is irrepressible when a Pakistani visits India and vice versa, and I am no exception. The one thing that strikes you immediately is the realisation that the Indian media love to hate Pakistan. Even when they are talking about cheating allegations against Sri Lankan cricketers, the background television footage shows Pakistani players. Pakistanis are painted as villains in every form; whether it is terrorism or cheating in cricket and, of course, the ISI, blamed instinctively for all ills in India, is the ultimate villain.
At present, there is demand for re-auctioning 2G licenses (related to cell phone service) because Eteslat, one of the licensees, is perceived to be in cohorts with the ISI simply because it also operates in Pakistan.
Whether true or false, by continuously portraying Pakistan as the big, bad villain, the media and the establishment are making life very difficult for the leaders in the sub-continent. Since neighbours cannot be changed; both countries have no option but to coexist. In running Pakistan down constantly, the Indian public is being conditioned not only to hate Pakistan but also Pakistanis, which will make it very difficult for the Indian leaders to sell any scheme for reconciliation (if there is one in our lifetime) to the Indians.
On a visit to an archeological site in the suburbs of Chennai (old Madras), I hired a guide. While he was delivering his rehearsed speech, a group of bubbly young college students from Andhra Pradesh set themselves at a vantage point to hear the guide’s commentary for free. Not to be outsmarted, he negotiated a discounted rate with the group leader after which the giggly girls and the spritely boys became very friendly with me and I soon became part of their group. After sometime, one of them asked me where I was from. “Pakistan,” I answered. The group’s warmth towards me promptly dissipated. When we arrived at the next statue, I found myself alone with the guide who had to complete the round with me any way.
I observed that in most places, warm greetings turned into polite smiles when Indians found out they were speaking to a Pakistani. Following the Mumbai attacks, Indian media have done irreparable damage to the Indo-Pak people to people contact. If only they were to allow our news channels to be viewed there as well and give Indians a chance to discover that ordinary Pakistanis are themselves victims of terrorism.
Notwithstanding its dislike for Pakistan, India is doing well for itself. The most striking contrast between the two countries is in terms of law and order. There are no gun-toting civilian guards to be seen in India. Automatic weapons are only seen in the hands of law enforcement agencies and that too in sensitive places such as airports, government buildings, and now, near the Taj Hotel in Mumbai after the terrorism episode that occurred there.
Whoever organised the Mumbai attacks needs to understand that such incidents only help unite Indian society in its resolve against Pakistan and as a result strengthen the anti-Pakistan stance of the Indian government.
On another note, traffic in India is terrible but commuters and drivers have somehow learnt to cope with it. Drivers appear to nudge each other off the road but do it with subtlety rather than aggression. I saw very little evidence of road rage there.
Indian institutions are intact and working, even if they are on subsidies. Their railway is still adding 500 plus miles of track to their system every year; adding thousands of new wagons and engines every year. It is the preferred mode of transport for most intercity travellers, considering the poor quality of intercity roads and excessive heavy vehicle traffic. Express ways are now being built on a BOT basis by the private sector. This approach is being successfully followed in other infrastructure projects including airports.
The inefficiency of Indian Airways is not dissimilar to PIA. They recently asked their government to give them a onetime amount of Rs 17,000 crores (Indians still talk in lakhs and crores) to enable them to overcome a financial crunch. But the private airlines are doing what the state airline is unable to do, and they are thriving, having taken up 85 percent of the market and having rendered Air India an insignificant player. The airline industry as an institution is, therefore, working very well.
Their police and criminal justice system, despite its corruption, is still intact. In Jaipur, I was stopped for sitting in the front seat without a seatbelt. The constable threatened to fine us Rs 700 and told us that he had informed his superior (apparently he did not have the power to fine us). After a few minutes of harassment, our driver took him aside, handed him a hundred rupee note, and we were on our way. Despite the corruption, the seatbelt rule and helmets for motorcyclists were effectively enforced.
Public transport, be it in the form of an ‘auto’ (as a rickshaw is called in India), cycle-rickshaw (still in abundance here) or taxi, all appeared properly registered, uniformly painted, and under the control of the police. In Bombay, all rickshaw and taxi drivers wear uniforms.
There are few policemen visible in most Indian towns, even if you count the traffic police. Even though the gap between the rich and the poor is acute and more than 35 percent of the people still live below the poverty line, jewellery stores do not require special guards, nor are there any visible police arrangements.
The criminal justice system is archaic and slow, but it has a long memory. The recent conviction of 11 Muslims involved in the Gogra incident, more than a decade after the incident, is a case in point.
Tax collectors are dreaded, even though, there is still a lot of black money floating around and there are more than a trillion dollars reportedly stashed away by the Indian elite in Swiss banks. Every day, there are reports of raids by the dreaded CBI (the Indian equivalent of our FIA). At the receiving end are high-profile politicians, bureaucrats, industrialists, and film actors.
As a result, people are concerned about keeping their accounts in order. The Indian tax system exists for everyone. People have to explain the source of income funding their assets and lifestyle. That is perhaps one reason why they prefer to keep untaxed money abroad. Not that they don’t splurge inside the country. There are newspaper reports of a Rs 100 crore (200 crore Pakistani rupees) wedding celebrating the marriage of the children of two politicians. The bride’s father reportedly gifted a Rs 33 crore helicopter to the groom.
While one can give any number of reasons for India’s current confidence in itself as a country, there are two reasons, which stand out in my opinion. Firstly, the power of the state’s writ and consequent law and order in society. Secondly, effective education at all levels of Indian society. These are the two goals Pakistan also needs to work towards to stay relevant in the sub-continent.
Under the ‘best’ team
19-February-2011
Against all odds, this government has completed sixty per cent of its term. But what price has the country had to pay for this achievement, which is the result of its politically expedient compromises?
A prime example is the strategy of consensus-building on critical financial issues. In working parliamentary democracies, governments take the budget to parliament, backed by a Finance Bill and after consultations with all the relevant stakeholders. The government falls if it still cannot get the Finance Bill approved. That is how important financial matters are in a working democracy.
The government was convinced that a VAT had to be imposed and had borrowed money from the IMF on the premise that a value-added tax was going to be levied for an increase in the tax base. It chickened out during the budget and, for almost eight months, has been postponing the imposition of the newly concocted RGST. While politically everyone is claiming credit for new taxes not being imposed and the common man thus being “saved,” nobody is telling the man on the street that the resultant deficit is reducing his buying power by the day. Because of politically expedient decision-making and the consequent need to print more notes to finance the deficit, the economy is running into the ground and life for the common man is becoming still more unbearable.
Meanwhile, with the global oil prices going up, the government does not have the courage to charge the actual cost of petrol from the public, again opting to print more currency notes to keep things going. The government’s objective is staying in power and completing its term, regardless of what the country’s condition is going to be at the end of that term.
Despite the unending printing of new currency notes, the federal government Is in such financial straits that it is difficult to arrange the payment of salaries to government servants. The army is short of operational money, with reports that helicopters being used in anti-terrorist efforts have had to be grounded because of shortage of fuel.
The casualness of financial decision-making is mind-blowing. No one bothered to determine whether the provincial governments, where the bulk of government servants are, can afford a fifty-per-cent increase in salaries in one go, when the normal increments of only 7.5 per cent were already increasing the financial burden every year. By one uninformed decision the cabinet wiped out the benefits of the much trumpeted additional money being transferred to the provinces following the NFC Award, which transferred additional responsibilities to them.
The contagious trend of market salary for government servants started from the success story of the Motorway Police and spread to the rest of the police, and to the army and all other departments. So while salaries, and consequently pensions, doubled in the last few years, nobody has bothered to evaluate whether the delivery doubled as well in terms of the scale and quality of work, or even improved marginally.
Rather than coming down, corruption has gone up, if the media and Transparency International are to be believed. The success of the Motorway Police was due not just to better salary but to a culture of efficiency which the department adopted right from the start. You can’t improve the efficiency of a normal government department simply by doubling the salaries without improving the work culture.
Because of this overspending on salaries, hardly anything is left for other things so essential to the effective use of the services of the staff, like money for utilities, travelling, and other contingencies. The development budget, meant to be spent on strengthening infrastructure, among other things, is being slashed at an unprecedented scale.
How do you improve things if this same government is to lead the country for another two years? The logical answer is: change the team running the government. When the dissolution of the cabinet was announced, there was hope that members of the team who had performed badly would be replaced and the government would find competent and honest persons in their place. But what actually happened was that only four new faces were introduced, and two of the better ministers in the cabinet were dropped, while 18 old ministers continued. This obviously implies that the prime minister and his “new” team are the best the present government has. In that case, God help Pakistan.
The government continues to borrow with abandon and has doubled the national debt in only three years. What gives the right even to an elected government to pursue an unsustainable agenda by not levying taxes and indulging in direct subsidy, with political motives (for example, the Benazir Income Support Programme is an example)? The Fiscal Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, 2005, enacted to limit this kind of irresponsible behaviour has gone out the window. The issue of galloping indebtedness is not even an issue with the media.
Amid such incompetent decision-making, can we afford another two years with the same team? Perhaps Raza Rabbani’s committee should do one more good deed for this nation and amend the Constitution through a 20th Amendment to reduce the government’s term to four years, so that general elections become due in March.
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